

# University of Zurich


Faculty of Law Fall Semester 2012

# Law & Economics Economic Analysis of Law

Procedural Law

Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann/Dr. Mark Steiner Slides by Prof. Dr. Rolf H. Weber / Dr. Mark Steiner

# **Stages in a Legal Dispute (1)**



# **Stages in a Legal Dispute (2)**

### 1. Damage

Causal connection between injury and the involved

## 2. Legal action

Minor damages?

## 3. Settlement / exchange of information

- Settle outside the courtroom
- USA: "pre-trial discovery"
- Europe: Presentation of evidence

## 4. Bargaining between the parties

Eventually mediation, out-of-court settlement, "ADR"

# **Stages in a Legal Dispute (3)**


#### 5. Trial

- Legal costs
  - Fees
  - Lawyers
  - Opportunity costs
- Who bears the costs
  - "European Rule": Losing party pays
  - "American Rule": Each pays his own


### 6. Appeal

- Costs?
- Other decision makers
  - Jury v. judge
  - "moods" of judges?

# Stages in a Legal Dispute Expected Value of a Legal Claim



# **Stages in a Legal Dispute**



# **Market for Legal Claims (1)**


- Influencing variables on the market for legal claims
  - Costs of the legal claim
  - Expected value of the claim
- (Private) costs of the legal claim
  - Cost allocation of the courts
  - Who bears the courts fees?
  - Class actions possible?
  - Market for lawyers
    - Price of lawyers' service
    - Number, form of legislation?
  - Agency problems

# **Market for Legal Claims (2)**

## Expected Compensation

- Jury or judge?
- Punitive damages?
  - USA: "Oh my god"— rule
  - Amorphous system
- Independence of judges?

## **Stages in a Legal Dispute**



## **Private and Social Costs**

## Private costs => Expected value of legal claim

Costs v. benefit of the claim

#### Social costs

- Costs of courts
- USA 2002
  - Civil law disputes before the court: 20 million cases
  - Criminal law disputes: 16 million cases
- USA 1983
  - Civil and criminal law costs 39.7 Bio. \$ = 170 per person

### Lawyers

- 20 times more in US than in Japan
- 5 times more than in Germany

# Claim or Not (1)? Private v. Social Costs

- Example: "Small accident"
  - Strict liability
    - Risk of accident: 10%
  - CHF 10 could reduce the risk of accidents (-9%)
  - Damages of 1'000 CHF
- Strict liability:
  - Costs of accident: 1'000 x 10% = 100
  - Costs of caution:  $10 + (1'000 \times 1\%) = 20$
- Tort law provide incentives for optimal caution

# Claim or Not (2)? Private v. Social Costs

## Problems of preventive complaint cost

- Costs for plaintiff: 3'000 CHF
- Costs for defendant: 2'000 CHF


### **Example:**

- Complaint costs = 3'000 < 1'000 => No claim
- Without claim no incentive for caution!

# Claim or Not (3)? Private v. Social Costs

### Accident :

- Social/administrative costs of accident
  - 10% x 1'000 = 100
- Social/administrative costs of a claim
  - But:  $10 + 1\% \times (1'000 + 3'000 + 2'000) = 70$
- Claim is socially desirable



Tort law loses its incentive component, because private costs for claim are too high

## Social/Private Costs of a Legal Claim (1)

### Divergence between social/private desirable claims:

- Private person considers only his own costs
- Disregard of:
  - Costs for the other party
  - Costs of court
  - Precautions, social costs => Incentives for others



Half of the costs of a legal claims are not taken into consideration

## Social/Private Costs of a Legal Claim (2)

#### Counter measures

- Settlements outside the court
- Plaintiff pays the court fees
  - Might be counterproductive
  - In which cases?
- Losing party pays
  - Incentives for claims
  - In which cases?
- Categorisation would be necessary

# Settlement or Trial? European v. American Rule

### American Rule:

Each pays his own costs

### European Rule:

Loser pays all

# Settlement or Trial? (1) (American Rule)

## Example

- Plaintiff:
  - Chance of winning 80%, damage 100'000
  - Costs 15'000
- Defendant
  - Chance of winning 50%, damage 100'000
  - Costs 20'000
- What happens?

# Settlement or Trial? (2) (American Rule)

### Example:

- Plaintiff
  - Expected value 80% x 100'000 = 80'000
  - 80'000 − 15'000 = **65'000**
- Defendant
  - Expected loss 50% x 100'000 = 50'000
  - **70'000 + 20'000 = 70'000**
- Negotiating range for settlement
  - "Threat value" plaintiff v. defendant

# Settlement or Trial? (1) (European Rule)

### Example

- Plaintiff:
  - Chance of winning 80%, damage 100'000
  - Costs 15'000
- Defendant
  - Chance of winning 50%, damage 100'000
  - Costs 20'000
- What happens?

# Settlement or Trial? (2) (European Rule)

### Example:

- Plaintiff
  - Expected value 80% x 100'000 = 80'000
  - Cost risk: 20% x 35'000 = 7'000
  - 80'000 − 7'000 = **73'000**
- Defendant
  - Expected loss 50% x 100'000 = 50'000
  - Cost risk: 50% x 35'000 = 17'500
  - **50'000 + 17'500 = 67'500**

## No negotiating range for settlement

"Threat value" plaintiff v. defendant

# **Settlement or Trial? Informations**

### Assessment of the parties

- Asymmetric information
  - "Bad news is free"
  - "Good news" are withheld
- Relative optimism

### Judicial system : Information obligations

- USA: Pre-trial discovery
  - Exploration of evidence before the case comes to trial
- Europe:
  - Proof before judge
- Which rules are more efficient in which cases?

### Psychology

Willingness to take risks

# **Settlement or Trial? Nuisance Suits**

### Claims with low amount of damages

- European system
  - Plaintiff  $0 (p) \times 1'000 = X$
  - Defendant 0 + (p) x 5'000 = X
- American system
  - Plaintiff 0 1'000 = -1'000
  - Defendant 0 + 5'000 = 5'000

#### Do such court cases make sense?

- Asymmetric information
- Higher opportunity costs for the defendant

## Social/Private Costs – Settlements (1)

#### Settlement

- Plaintiff saves attorneys' fees
- Again: Disregard of court fees

#### Problems:


- Asymmetric information
  - Wrong assumptions lead to undesirable claims or settlements
- Settlement: lack of deterrence

## Social/Private Costs – Settlements (2)

#### Influence?

- Mediation
- Exchange of evidence
- Objective: Lower legal costs
- Conclusion:
  - Trial as a "threat" to find a settlement and avert social expensive legal procedures

## **Stages in a Legal Dispute**



# Trial (1)

#### Private costs

- Contradictory arguments
  - "Arms race", competition
- Confusing arguments
  - Extend and complicates the legal process
- Inappropriate arguments
  - "Money goes up in smoke"

### Equipment of trials

- Independency of judges
- Jury?

### Evidence procedure

- USA: pre trial discovery v. Europe: evidence
- Burden of evidence, signs, etc.

# Trial (2)


## Effect of judgement:

- Compensation/redress
- Deterrence/incentives

#### Problem:

- Missing incentives
  - Tort: optimal precautions
  - No negligence
  - Compensation is required, legal costs without benefit

## **Stages in a Legal Dispute**



## **Appeal - Overview**

## Correcting mistakes

- Reverse an error (alpha error)
- Reverse a correct decision (beta error)
- Efficiency of the litigation market
- Enacting social norms
  - Judge-made law
  - Efficiency as a judicial motive?
    - Redistribution effects v. efficiency effects

## Problem: Non reversible penalties

- Corporal punishment; death penalty
- Social punishment; reputation effects